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In many countries, important features of municipal government (such as the electoral system, mayors’ salaries, and the
number of councillors) depend on whether the municipality is above or below arbitrary population thresholds. Several
papers have used a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to measure the effects of these threshold-based policies on political
and economic outcomes. Using evidence from France, Germany, and Italy, we highlight two common pitfalls that arise
in exploiting population-based policies (compound treatment and sorting), and we provide guidance for detecting and
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Researchers attempting to estimate the effects ofpolicies face serious endogeneity problems: It isusually impossible to run an experiment inwhich
consequential policies are randomized, and in most ob-
servational data, it is difficult to locate or construct valid
counterfactuals given the various strategic and contex-
tual factors that affect policy choices. In recent years,
many researchers have attempted to address these prob-
lems by exploiting cases in which policies at the subna-
tional (usually municipal) level depend discontinuously
on population thresholds. The use of regression disconti-
nuity designs (RDDs)basedonpopulation thresholdswas
first suggested by Pettersson-Lidbom (2006, 2012), who
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evaluated the effect of the size of themunicipal council on
the extent of municipal spending in Sweden and Finland
by comparing cities above and below population thresh-
olds that determine council size. Subsequent researchers
have used population-threshold RDDs to study the ef-
fects of the salary of public officials (see De Benedetto
and De Paola 2014; Ferraz and Finan 2009; Gagliarducci
and Nannicini 2013; van der Linde et al. 2014), gen-
der quotas (see Campa 2011; Casas-Arce and Saiz 2015),
electoral rules (see Barone and De Blasio 2013; Eggers
2015; Fujiwara 2011; Gulino 2014; Hopkins 2011; Pellicer
and Wegner 2013), direct democracy (see Arnold and
Freier 2015; Asatryan et al. 2013; Asatryan, Baskaran, and
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Heinemann 2014), fiscal transfers (see Baskaran 2012;
Brollo et al. 2013; Litschig and Morrison 2010, 2013),
and (like Pettersson-Lidbom 2006, 2012) council size
(see Egger and Koethenbuerger 2010; Koethenbuerger
2012). We survey 28 papers using population-threshold
RDDs inTable 5 in the supporting information. The exist-
ing literature has evaluated population-based policies in
12 countries on four continents, including the United
States, Spain, Brazil, Morocco, India, and Japan; our own
casual search quickly yielded examples of similar poli-
cies in several other countries where, to our knowledge,
no such study has been carried out (e.g., the United
Kingdom, Belgium, Austria, Norway, Poland, Slovakia,
andMongolia). Fundamentally, thepopulation-threshold
RDD is an attractive research design because at the rele-
vant population threshold, we can compare sets of cities
that implemented different policies but are comparable
in other important respects.
In this article, we highlight two pitfalls that (based
on our study of France, Italy, and Germany) complicate
the use of population-threshold RDDs. The first pitfall
is that the same population threshold is often used to
determine multiple policies, which makes it difficult to
interpret the results of RDD estimation as measuring the
effect of any one particular policy. We show the extent
of compound treatment in the three countries we study,
emphasizing that extensive institutional background re-
search is necessary before one can interpret the results of
a population-threshold RDD as evidence of the effect of
a particular policy.1 When discussing potential remedies,
we also highlight the difference-in-discontinuities design
as a possible solution in cases where a treatment of in-
terest changes in tandem with other policies, but one can
locate a comparable period or setting where these other
policies change on their own.
The second pitfall is sorting—the tendency of mu-
nicipalities to strategically manipulate their official pop-
ulation in order to fall on the desired side of a conse-
quential population threshold. It is well known that the
continuity assumption, necessary for identification in the
RDD, may not hold when there is precise manipulation
of the running variable (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee
and Lemieux 2009; McCrary 2008); evidence of manip-
ulation has been produced by Urquiola and Verhoogen
(2009) for the case of class size, Barreca et al. (2011)
for birth weight, and Caughey and Sekhon (2011) for
close elections (though see also Eggers et al. 2015). Our
main contribution here is to show conclusive evidence of
manipulative sorting in official population numbers in
1See Keele and Titiunik (2015) for a discussion of compound treat-
ment in RDDs based on geographical boundaries.
France, Italy, and Germany;2 we also show that the stan-
dard tests for sorting are biasedwhen the running variable
is discrete (as in the case of population-threshold RDDs),
and we highlight some of the special challenges involved
with assessing covariate imbalance in settings where data
are pooled from multiple thresholds.
The evidence we present from France, Italy, and
Germany shows why carrying out population-threshold
RDDs in these countries requires care; readers should not
conclude, however, that population-threshold RDDs are
always problematic or that there are better ways to study
the policies that have been addressed with population-
threshold RDDs. We suspect that both compound treat-
ment and manipulative sorting are serious problems in
many countries that use population thresholds to assign
municipal policies, but even in the countries we study,
one can identify policies and thresholds such that nei-
ther compound treatment nor sorting appears to pose
much of a problem. When these problems do arise, there
are remedies that we discuss that involve weaker assump-
tions than would be necessary for any feasible alternative
design. The countries we study are also not representative
of all settings where population thresholdsmay be carried
out; we chose these countries both because many munic-
ipal policies depend on population thresholds (and they
have done so for a long time)3 and because we are famil-
iar with these cases from previous work, but we suspect
that compound treatment is less pervasive in countries
where fewer policies depend on population thresholds
(e.g., seeHopkins2011on theUnitedStates) and sorting is
less problematic in countrieswheremunicipal population
counts are linked more closely to national administrative
data (e.g., see Pettersson-Lidbom 2012 on Finland and
Sweden). Especially given the general challenges we face
in studying the effects of policies, it would be a mistake
to conclude from our analysis that population-threshold
RDDs should be eschewed in favor of other designs—not
just because these problems do not afflict every popula-
tion threshold, and not just because there are solutions
2Related to our work, Litschig (2012) looks at top-down manipu-
lation of population figures in Brazil; Foremny, Monseny, and Sole´
Olle´ (2015) highlight the issue of sorting around population fig-
ures in Spain; and a privately circulated paper by Kristof De Witte,
Benny Geys, and Joep Heirman discusses sorting in Belgium.
3The first law on municipal government in revolutionary France
(passed December 14, 1789) includes six provisions dictating fea-
tures of municipal government as a function of population, in-
cluding a rule specifying six population thresholds determining
the council size. An 1808 reform in Prussia used population cut-
offs of 3,500 and 10,000 to assign different rules on council size,
voting rights, and budget transparency (among others). In Italy,
the Legge Lanza of 1865 specified population cutoffs determining
council size, executive committees, and voting rights in the former
Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia.
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(which we discuss in depth) to these problems, but also
because even in the face of these problems, a population-
threshold RDD may be preferable to the next best
design.
Compound Treatment
The population-thresholdRDD is appealing because it al-
lows the researcher to compare outcomes in a set of cities
where one subset is required to implement one policy
(say, A), whereas another identical-in-expectation subset
is required to implement another policy (A′). The first
common problem we highlight in this article is that often
the population threshold that determines whether policy
A or A′ is applied will also determine whether other poli-
cies (B or B ′, C or C ′, and so on) are applied; the policy
change we hope to study (A vs. A′) is thus confounded
with other policy changes, undermining the appeal of the
RDD. We refer to this situation as one with “compound
treatment.”4
Documenting the Extent of Compound
Treatment
Figure 1 summarizes the problem based on our investiga-
tionof laws applying tomunicipalities inFrance, Italy, and
German states. Each dot indicates a population threshold
at which at least one policy changes; solid dots indicate
that more than one policy changes at the same threshold.
In every case, there are some thresholds where just one
policy changes, but such thresholds are in the minority.
Table 1 provides details on the various policies that
change at population thresholds up to 50,000 in France;
the supporting information provides details about
population-dependent policies in Italy and Germany
(see Tables 6 and 7). As Table 1 indicates, at every thresh-
old at which council size increases, themaximumnumber
of deputy mayors also increases, which makes it impossi-
ble to disentangle the effect of council size from the effect
of additional paid council staff. There is only one thresh-
old (1,000 inhabitants) at which the salary of mayors and
deputy mayors increases without the council size also in-
creasing. Many of the most interesting policies change at
a single threshold of 3,500 inhabitants, at which several
other policies (including council size and mayor’s wage)
also change: the electoral rule used to elect the council,
4Keele and Titiunik (2014) use this term in the same way in their
discussion of spatial RDD. Note that in the epidemiological litera-
ture, VanderWeele (2011) uses “compound treatments” to refer to
situations where there are different versions of treatment.
the requirement of gender parity in party electoral lists,
and the requirement that the council debate the budget
before adopting it.
In the 13 German states, a total of 65 different
types of municipal policy depend on population thresh-
olds; no state has fewer than 14 different policies that
are determined by population thresholds. (See Appendix
Table 7 for details.) The thresholds determining these
policies vary across states, ranging from 70 inhabitants
to one million. Importantly, of 759 policy-threshold ob-
servations across German states (i.e., cases where a policy
changes at a given threshold in a given state), only 94
do not coincide with another policy change. For mayoral
salary, certainly one of the most important of these poli-
cies, we find only 12 cases (of 116 in total) in which no
other policy changes at the same threshold in the state.5
Detecting whether a given treatment is confounded
with another treatment can simply be a matter of scour-
ing the legal code for mentions of population thresh-
olds.6 In some cases, enumerating the full set of policies
that change at a threshold is more complicated, however,
because some policies depend on population thresholds
only indirectly. An example of this type of second-order
policy is given in Lyytika¨inen and Tukianen (2013): The
maximum number of candidates on electoral lists in Fin-
land is a function of the council size, which changes dis-
continuously at population thresholds.7 Another example
from Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca (2015) highlights
how subtle the interactions among policies can be: In
German municipal elections, parties winning less than a
certain vote share are denied representation on the coun-
cil; this constraint is never binding when the municipal
council is below a certain size, which implies that there is
a population threshold at which the council size increases
and a vote share cutoff goes into effect (though this would
not be clear without detailed knowledge of the electoral
5InGermany and other federal systems, the task of locating relevant
thresholds is complicated by the fact that higher-level authorities
may also enact policies based on municipal population thresholds;
in Germany, for example, the Federal Statistical Office used a dif-
ferent procedure to implement the 2011 census for municipalities
above and below 10,000 inhabitants.
6In the first article for Bavaria in Germany, see Egger and Koethen-
buerger (2010); the authors studied the effects of council size on
municipal expenditures usingpopulation-threshold rules for coun-
cil size. Due to the difficulties of detecting the legislation in the vast
amount of municipal code, it went unnoticed that the same thresh-
olds are used to determine an array of other policies (e.g., direct
funding for the towns of different sizes, direct democratic provi-
sions). As no individual threshold for council size is unique, the
effects of those additional treatments cannot be separated from the
council size treatment.
7Lyytika¨inen and Tukianen (2013) use an instrumental variables
approach to tackle the compound treatment issue.
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FIGURE 1 Population Thresholds atWhichMunicipal Policies
Change: France, Italy, and German States
Note: Each dot indicates a population threshold at which a policy changes; solid dots
indicate more than one policy changing at the same threshold.
system). In short, a researcher should know a setting in-
timately before concluding that a given policy (and not
other policies) changes at a given population threshold.
Addressing Compound Treatment
Suppose a policy of interest is determined by a population
threshold, but other policies change at the same threshold.
How can a researcher proceed?
Consider a simple setup where the observed out-
come is equal to the potential outcome associated with
the set of compound treatments actually received by mu-
nicipality i at time t: Yit = Y (Kit), where Kit ∈ IRk is a
k-dimensional vector containing the realizations of k (bi-
nary) treatments. Without loss of generality, assume the
treatment of interest (say, policy A) is contained in the
first cell of the vector Kit , which can thus be decomposed
as Kit = (Ait ,V′it)′, where Vit is a (k − 1)-dimensional
vector containing all treatments but policy A. We refer to
Kit as the vector of all compound treatments, and to Vit
as the vector of the confounding treatments with respect
to the policy of interest A. Further assume that treatment
assignment sharply changes in population size, Pit , at the
cutoff Pc . In particular, at time t = t1, policy A is in place
for municipalities above Pc , but not for those below Pc .
The same cutoff, however, triggers a change in the con-
founding treatments too. Formally:
Kit =
{
K1v if Pit ≥ Pc , t = t1
K0v˜ if Pit < Pc , t = t1
,
where K1v = (1, v′)′ and K0v˜ = (0, (1 − v)′)′.
To identify any causal effect, the simplest option is to
change the quantity of interest and focus on the bundle of
policies that simultaneously change at Pc . In fact, under
somecircumstances, itmaybeworth studying the effect of
the bundle of policiesK1v versusK0v˜ . In France, for exam-
ple, changes in council size always coincide with changes
in the number of deputymayors; the perfect confounding
of these two policies means that it is impossible to sepa-
rate the effect of the two treatments, but onemay still esti-
mate the effect of this bundle of policies. The downside is
that, as the number of compound treatments k increases,
it becomes more difficult to motivate and interpret the
analysis beyond the immediate setting being considered.
If we want to keep the focus on the policy of in-
terest A, we need to make some ignorability assumption
with respect to the effects of the confounding treatments
(Keele and Titiunik 2014). One strong assumption would
214 ANDREW C. EGGERS ET AL.
TABLE 1 Population Thresholds in FrenchMunicipalities
Policy Changes at k inhabitants (in tsd)
0.1 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 5 9 10 20 30 50
Council size x x x x x x x x x x
Salary of mayor and deputy mayors x x x x x x
Max. number of deputy mayors x x x x x x x x x x
Max. number of nonresident councilors x x
Must have a cemetery x
Prohibition on commercial water supply x
Campaign leaflets subsidized x
Council must approve property sales x
Electoral system: PR or plurality x
Gender parity x
Outsourcing scrutiny x
Council must debate budget prior to vote x
Committees follow PR principle x
Amount of paid leave for council work x x x
Commission on accessibility x
Max. electoral expenditure x
Outsourcing commission x
Max. municipal tax on salaries x x
Debt limit x
Note: The table identifies population thresholds (in thousands) at which given policies change. This is a partial list of policies, chosen
to highlight the variety of policies that depend on population thresholds and the extent to which the same threshold often determines
multiple policies.
Source: French legal code.
be that Y (K1v) = Y (K1v˜) and Y (K0v) = Y (K0v˜); that is,
the confounding treatments do not affect the outcome.
Under this assumption and the standard assumption of
continuity in potential outcomes (Hahn, Todd, and Van
der Klaauw 2001), the cross-sectional RDD estimator at
t1 identifies the (local) average treatment effect of policy
A in the neighborhood of Pc :
ˆRDD ≡ lim
p→P+c
E [Yit |Pit = p, t = t1]
− lim
p→P−c
E [Yit |Pit = p, t = t1]
= E [Y (K1v) − Y (K0v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t1]
= E [Y (K1v) − Y (K0v)|Pit = Pc , t = t1]
= E [Y (K1v˜) − Y (K0v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t1] ,
where the last two expressions represent the (local) aver-
age treatment effect of policy A conditional on the fact
that the confounding policies are equal to v and v˜, re-
spectively. The fact that they are equal simply means that,
under continuity and ignorability, the RDD estimator
identifies the (local) average treatment effect of A with
no further restrictions.
The ignorability assumption, however, is hardly plau-
sible in most empirical settings. And if it is not met, the
RDD estimator cannot identify any causal effect of policy
A alone:
ˆRDD = E [Y (K1v) − Y (K0v)|Pit = Pc , t = t1]
+E [Y (K0v) − Y (K0v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t1] ,
where the first term is one of the (local) average treatment
effects of policy A that researchers may want to estimate,
and the second is the bias introduced by the confounding
policies.
To remove this bias and isolate the causal effect of pol-
icy A alone, the most promising way to proceed is to look
for other settings where the confounding policies change
but the policy of interest does not; under assumptions
we lay out shortly, the difference between the effect of
all compound treatments (Kit) and the effect of the con-
founding policies (Vit) gives an unbiased estimate of the
effect ofpolicy A. This approach,whichcombines features
of the regression discontinuity design and the difference-
in-differences design, is what Grembi, Nannicini, and
Troiano (2016) call the difference-in-discontinuity (diff-
in-disc) design. Here, we present this framework to a
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broader audience, generalize the results to the case of
multiple compound treatments, and elaborate on differ-
ent ways the diff-in-disc estimator can be applied.
To see how the diff-in-disc design can work in prac-
tice, assume that policy A was introduced at time t1,
but researchers also have information on time t0, when
the confounding treatments (but not A) changed at Pc .
Formally:
Kit =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
K1v if Pit ≥ Pc , t = t1
K0v if Pit ≥ Pc , t = t0
K0v˜ if Pit < Pc
.
In addition to the standard continuity assumption,
identification rests on the following assumption of local
parallel trends.
Assumption 1. E [Y (K0v) − Y (K0v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t1] =
E [Y (K0v) − Y (K0v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t0],
E [Y (K1v) − Y (K1v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t1] =
E [Y (K1v) − Y (K1v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t0].8
This assumption can be interpreted from two per-
spectives. Most directly, it states that the effect of the con-
founding policies (v vs. v˜), holding fixed policy A, is time
invariant. In other words, municipalities just above and
just below Pc would have been on parallel trends between
t0 and t1 had policy Anot been introduced at t1. (Note that
this assumption is more local than the standard parallel
trends assumption in difference-in-differences, as it must
hold only in the neighborhood of the policy threshold
Pc .) From a different angle, the assumption states that
the (time) difference in potential outcomes between t0
and t1, again holding fixed policy A, must be continuous
in population size at Pc . From this second perspective,
the assumption is analogous to the RDD assumption of
continuity in potential outcomes across the threshold.
In a setting with two compound treatments, Grembi,
Nannicini, and Troiano (2016) show how the above as-
sumption is sufficient for identification. Indeed, under
continuity and local parallel trends, the diff-in-disc esti-
mator yields the (local) average treatment effect of policy
A conditional on V = v:
ˆDDISC ≡
(
lim
p→P+c
E [Yit |Pit = p, t = t1]
− lim
p→P−c
E [Yit |Pit = p, t = t1]
)
−( lim
p→P+c
E [Yit |Pit = p, t = t0]
8As shown below, only the first part of the assumption (i.e., the
part conditional on the case of no treatment, A = 0) is needed for
identification, but the second part can be used to extrapolate the
identified estimand beyond t1.
− lim
p→P−c
E [Yit |Pit = p, t = t0]
)
= E [Y (K1v) − Y (K0v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t1]
−E [Y (K0v) − Y (K0v˜)|Pit = Pc , t = t0]
= E [Y (K1v) − Y (K0v)|Pit = Pc ] .
Note that the estimand identified above is narrower
than the standard RDD estimand, as it is conditional on
specific realizations of the confounding treatments (i.e.,
V = v). This interpretation reduces the external valid-
ity of the results, especially if the number of confound-
ing treatments is large. For example, assuming that A is
the mayor’s wage and V contains the electoral rule (ma-
joritarian vs. proportional), the size of the city council,
and the amount of federal transfers, the above result tells
us that the diff-in-disc design recovers the causal effect of
the wage only for municipalities that use a majoritarian
system, elect a large city council, and receive large trans-
fers from the federal government. In order to identify
the standard RDD estimand represented by the average
treatment effect of A in a neighborhood of Pc (i.e., in our
example, the causal effect of themayor’s wage irrespective
of the electoral system, the council size, and the amount of
federal transfers), we need to introduce a separability as-
sumption about the effects of the compound treatments.
Assumption 2. Y (Kit) = Y (0) +  ′kKit , where k is a k-
dimensional vector containing the (additively separable)
effects of the compound treatments: (a, b, . . . , k)′.
It is straightforward to show that, under this further
assumption, the diff-in-disc estimator identifies the (lo-
cal) average treatment effect of A in the entire neighbor-
hood of the threshold: ˆDDISC = E [a |Pit = Pc ]. Given a
setting where a policy of interest changes alongwith other
confounding policies, then,we can use the diff-in-disc de-
sign to recover the effect of the policy of interest if we have
a second setting inwhich the confounding policies change
on their own and if we are willing to assume that the effect
of changing the confounding policies (holding fixed the
policy of interest) is the same in the two settings. In what
situations is this possible?
Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016) illustrate
what we might call a longitudinal diff-in-disc design
in order to estimate the effect of fiscal constraints on
deficits. Starting in 2001, Italian municipalities below
5,000 were exempted from fiscal constraints that applied
to larger cities. A cross-sectional RDDanalysis in the post-
2001 period using the 5,000 population threshold would
thus seem like a good way to study the effect of fiscal
constraints versus no fiscal constraints. The problem is
that (as noted in Table 6 of this article) the salary of the
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mayor and other executive officers also changes at the
5,000 threshold. Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016)
thus implement a diff-in-disc design in which the cross-
sectional RDD effect at the 5,000 threshold before 2001
(when fiscal constraints applied to all municipalities) is
subtracted from the same effect after 2001 (when fiscal
constraints only applied to municipalities above 5,000 in
population). This procedure yields a consistent estimate
of the effect of fiscal constraints under the local parallel
trends assumption that the effect of the other policies that
change at this threshold is stable over time and the sep-
arability assumption that the effect of fiscal constraints
does not depend on these confounding policies. Campa
(2011) and Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) provide other ex-
amples of diff-in-disc designs with population thresholds
in the estimation of the impact of electoral gender quota
in Spain.
Researchers can also consider what we might call a
cross-sectional diff-in-disc design to address the problemof
compound treatment. The key requirement of the cross-
sectional diff-in-disc is that the confounding policies also
change at some other threshold or in some other region
where the local parallel trends assumption and the sep-
arability assumption are plausible; that is, the effect of
the confounding policies is plausibly the same in the two
settings and does not depend on the value of the policy
of interest. Arnold and Freier (2015) and Eggers (2015)
provide evidence in this spirit by comparing RDD ef-
fects measured at different thresholds in the same system
in order to “difference out” the effects of confounding
policies. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) compare the
RDD effects at the same threshold but for mayors facing
different institutional constraints (i.e., term limit), and in
order to make the two settings comparable between each
other restrict their analysis to mayors who served for two
terms.
The same approach could, of course, be used when
the effect of the confounding policies can be measured in
an entirely different region or country where the policy of
interest does not change; the attractiveness of this design
depends on the plausibility of the local parallel trends
assumption.
Sorting
As mentioned above, the appeal of a population-
threshold-based RDD is partly that the political unit does
not choose the policy, which suggests that units just above
and below the threshold should be comparable in all
respects other than the policy. As is well known, such an
RDD (like any RDD) is less appealing when the units can
influence the variable that determines treatment assign-
ment (i.e., population). At an extreme, one could imag-
ine that cities near a population threshold could perfectly
controlwhether they endupaboveorbelow the threshold,
and thus cities that have policy A differ from cities that
have policy A′ not just in that policy but also in a whole
host of background characteristics that affected whether
they prefer policy A or policy A′.9 In such a situation, an
RDDmay be no better than a typical observational study
in which political units choose their policies.
The problems of strategic sorting in RDD applica-
tions are well known (see Barreca et al. 2011; Imbens
and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010; Urquiola and
Verhoogen 2009).10 Strategic sorting in population fig-
ures has been documented by Litschig (2012) for Brazil,
and it has been briefly mentioned by Gagliarducci and
Nannicini (2013) for the Italian case. One of our contri-
butions here is to provide evidence that sorting in RDD
studies based on population thresholds is an issue in all
three countries that we study. We also demonstrate tech-
niques for diagnosing and explaining manipulation, as
well as potential solutions to address this problem.
Aggregate Graphical Evidence
The basic pattern of sorting is documented in Figures 2
(France), 3 (Italy), and 4 (Germany). Because the figures
use the same format and reflect the same analysis, we
explain the French case in detail and subsequently note
only the relevant differences between the French case and
the others.
In France, we have population data for eight censuses
between 1962 and 2011.11 For each census, we calculate
the difference in population between each city and each
major population threshold (i.e., one affecting a policy
listed in Table 1) that was in force at the time of the
census; we store all municipality-years in which a city’s
population was within 250 inhabitants of a threshold. In
the left panel of Figure 2, we plot three histograms of these
9Alternatively, it may be that only certain cities are able to control
whether they end up above or below the threshold, in which case
cities that have policy A may differ from cities that have policy A′
not only in the factors that affect their policy preferences but also in
the factors that affect their ability to manipulate their population
figures.
10Le Barbanchon (2015) addresses the problemofmeasurement er-
ror in the running variable, which stands tomanipulative sorting in
RDDasweak instruments stand to endogeneity in the instrumental
variables framework.
11The census years are 1962, 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006,
and 2011. After 1999, France introduced a new census system that
produces annual population estimates for all municipalities; the
2006 census was the first such census.
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FIGURE 2 Sorting inMunicipal
Population in France,
1962–2011 Pooled
Histograms (bin width = 1)
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Note: The left plot depicts three histograms, one for
each group of thresholds (100; 500 and 1,000; 1,500
and larger). In each case, the bin width is 1, meaning
that the top of the line indicates the number of data
points (municipality-years) with a population that is
exactly a given amount (e.g., 50 inhabitants) from
the threshold. The right plot depicts the McCrary
analysis for all cases pooled.
population differences, one for each group of relevant
population thresholds (100; 500 or 1,000; and 1,500 and
larger). Because there are somanymunicipality-years, we
plot histograms with bin widths of 1. The key evidence of
sorting is given by the jumps in each histogram at 0. For
example, based on the histogram for the 100-inhabitant
threshold, we can see that there were just under 500 cases
inwhich a city was one person short of the 100-inhabitant
threshold at which the council size increases, but there
were almost 600 cases in which a city cleared that hurdle
by one person. The jump is even more striking for the
500- and 1,000-inhabitant thresholds (where the mayor’s
salary increases).
In the right panel of Figure 2, we depict the McCrary
test for all thresholds pooled.This procedure estimates the
density of the running variable (i.e., absolute distance in
inhabitants to a population threshold) separately on the
left and right of the threshold and tests for a jump or drop
in the density at the threshold. Not surprisingly (given the
histograms in the left panel), the McCrary test indicates
a large jump in the estimated density at the threshold.
FIGURE 3 Sorting inMunicipal
Population in Italy,
1961–2001 Pooled
Histograms (bin width = 10)
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Note: In the left plot, the bin width is 10, meaning
that the top of the line indicates the number of data
points (municipality-years) with a population that is
in a given interval (e.g., 40–49 inhabitants) from the
threshold. Otherwise, see notes to Figure 2.
Figure 3 indicates an even more striking pattern for
Italy. Based on the five decennial censuses from 1961 to
2001, we find about 90 cases in which a city cleared the
1,000 or 3,000 population threshold (atwhich themayor’s
wage increases, among other changes) by fewer than 10
inhabitants, but we find only about 20 cases in which
a city fell short by fewer than 10 inhabitants; in over
300 cases, a city cleared one of the thresholds by fewer
than 30 inhabitants, but in fewer than 100 cases did a city
fall short by fewer than 30. The pattern of sorting is just
as clear (if not as dramatic) at larger thresholds. Again,
the McCrary test aggregating all thresholds (right panel)
indicates a very large jump in the estimated density at the
threshold.
Figure 4 shows the same analysis for Germany. Here,
we have annual administrative data from 1998 to 2007 for
municipalities from all German states, and our analysis is
based on a comparison of eachmunicipality’s population
to all thresholds in force in that municipality’s state. The
histograms (left panel) indicate that sorting is nowhere
near as severehere, but theMcCrary test (rightpanel) does
indicate a significant jump in the density just above the
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FIGURE 4 Sorting inMunicipal
Population in German States,
1998–2007 Pooled
Histograms (bin width = 10)
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Note: In the left plot, the bin width is 10, meaning that
the top of the line indicates the number of data points
(municipality-years) with a population that is in a given
interval (e.g., 40–49 inhabitants) from the threshold. In
both plots, we restrict attention to thresholds where both
the council size and the mayor’s salary change. Otherwise,
see notes to Figure 2.
threshold. Note that here we focus on thresholds at which
either themayor’s salaryor the council size changes,which
makes for a closer comparisonwith the French and Italian
analysis; when we include the entire set of thresholds, we
find less evidence of sorting, as will be seen in the next
section, where we carry out McCrary analysis in each
country for specific types of thresholds.
Formal Tests at Different Types
of Thresholds
We now carry out the McCrary (2008) test for differ-
ent types of thresholds within countries, still pooling
population figures from the various censuses we have
collected. Before showing the results, we note that our
analysis here and throughout the article takes account of
two biases (previously unrecognized, as far as we know)
that arise when applying the standard McCrary test to a
discrete running variable. The McCrary test operates by
conducting RDD analysis on an under-smoothed his-
togram of the running variable.12 The first bias arises
because applying the standard algorithm to adiscrete run-
ning variable tends to result in a histogramwithmore ob-
servations in the first bin to the right of the threshold than
in the first bin to the left, evenwhen thedensity is perfectly
flat; fundamentally, this asymmetry arises because with a
discrete running variable, one can have observations ex-
actly at the threshold, and by default these observations
are assigned to the first bin to the right. We address this
problem by requiring that the bin width of the histogram
take an integer value;13 alternatively, one can simply set
the threshold to be−0.5, which eliminates the asymmetry
as long as the bin size is not exactly 0.5, 1.5, and so on.
The second bias arises when a discrete-valued running
variable is analyzed using relative deviations from thresh-
olds of different sizes, such as percentage distance from
thresholds of 500, 1,000, and 10,000 inhabitants; this cre-
ates a bias because all thresholds can produce a relative
deviation of 0 (which by default goes into the first bin to
the right of the threshold), but only very large thresholds
can produce a relative deviation of −. We address this
problem by using absolute deviations rather than relative
deviations. We explain these biases (both of which tend
to increase the likelihood of falsely detecting sorting, es-
pecially when data are very plentiful) and our solutions
to them in the supporting information.
Table 2 reports the results ofMcCrary analysis (incor-
porating these adjustments) at different types of thresh-
olds in all three countries. In the top row, we assess ev-
idence of sorting in all thresholds, reporting the point
estimate (i.e., the effect of crossing the threshold on the
log density) and standard error for each test, along with
the number of thresholds and observations.14 Consistent
with the previous figures, we find very clear evidence of
substantial sorting in France and Italy (with the latter
being quite a bit larger) and evidence of small but statis-
tically significant sorting in Germany. In the other rows,
we assess sorting at particular types of thresholds, such
as thresholds where the salary of the mayor increases, or
thresholds where the council size increases, or thresholds
where both increase. In France, we find significant sort-
ing at all types of thresholds, with the smallest effect (and
weakest evidence against the null) at thresholds where
12For a recent literature that estimates discontinuities in densities
and avoids pre-binning of the data, see Otsu, Xu, and Matsushita
(2013) and Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2015a, 2015b).
13More specifically, we force the bin size of the McCrary algorithm
to the closest integer value to the one chosen by default.
14We count only thresholds for which we observe cities within
250 inhabitants of the threshold, which explains why some of the
counts differ from the analysis above.
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TABLE 2 Summary of McCrary Sorting Tests
France Italy Germany
# of Thresholds McCrary # of Thresholds McCrary # of Thresholds McCrary
Sample (# of Close Obs.) Test Statistic (# of Close Obs.) Test Statistic (# of Close Obs.) Test Statistic
Total
All years, all
thresholds
21 0.238∗∗∗ 7 1.328∗∗∗ 195 0.068∗∗∗
(311,392) (0.014) (4,756) (0.136) (101,520) (0.025)
Specific thresholds
Salary increase 14 0.497∗∗∗ 6 1.331∗∗∗ 78 0.135∗∗∗
(140,421) (0.026) (4,730) (0.134) (11,579) (0.061)
Salary increase (no
council)
7 0.533∗∗∗ 3 0.840∗∗∗ 21 0.001
(35,329) (0.049) (2,125) (0.211) (447) (0.321)
Council increase 15 0.215∗∗∗ 3 1.909∗∗∗ 120 0.071∗∗∗
(267,558) (0.015) (2,605) (0.197) (81,669) (0.026)
Council increase (no
salary)
12 0.139∗∗∗ 0 n.a. 63 0.063∗∗∗
(162,466) (0.018) (0) n.a. (70,537) (0.029)
Council and/or salary
increase
21 0.240∗∗∗ 6 1.331∗∗∗ 141 0.072∗∗∗
(302,887) (0.014) (4,730) (0.134) (82,116) (0.027)
Council and salary
increase
7 0.475∗∗∗ 3 1.909∗∗∗ 57 0.149∗∗∗
(105,092) (0.029) (2,605) (0.197) (11,132) (0.063)
Threshold size
Small thresholds
(<3,500)
7 0.237∗∗∗ 2 1.644∗∗∗ 61 0.054∗∗∗
(306,520) (0.014) (3,295) (0.178) (93,873) (0.026)
Big thresholds
(≥3,500)
14 0.239∗ 5 0.700∗∗∗ 134 0.216∗∗∗
(4,872) (0.122) (1,461) (0.247) (7,647) (0.077)
Placebo thresholds 20 0.008 9 −0.044 186 −0.009
(215,986) (0.018) (2,800) (0.133) (85,326) (0.025)
Note: For each test, we report four numbers: the number of unique population thresholds (e.g., 14 in the first test for France) at which
we observe municipalities with populations within 250 inhabitants of the threshold; the number of observations within 250 inhabitants
of these thresholds (e.g., 273,274); the estimated difference log frequency above versus below the threshold (e.g., 0.256); and the standard
error of that estimate (0.015). Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
council size increases (but not mayor’s wage) and thresh-
olds at 3,500 inhabitants or higher. In Italy, the estimated
effects are much larger, with (as in France) smaller effects
at larger population thresholds. To give a sense of mag-
nitude, a McCrary effect size of 1.3 (the effect for Italy
at all thresholds) implies that the density on the right
of the average threshold is almost four times larger than
on the left. In Germany, the jumps in density are statis-
tically significant for most subsets and smaller but still
fairly substantial in magnitude: At thresholds where both
the council size and the mayor’s salary increases, for ex-
ample, there are about 15% more cities immediately to
the right of the threshold than immediately to the left.
The fact that sorting appears to be more severe when
we focus on thresholds determining salary and council
size is consistent with the idea that local officials strate-
gically manipulate population figures to obtain desirable
policies; at these thresholds, there is a clear incentive to
pass the threshold, whereas at some others (e.g., thresh-
olds above which cities are subject to more stringent fi-
nancial oversight), we would if anything expect sorting in
the other direction.
Comparing the effects by threshold size shows larger
effects for smaller thresholds in Italy and France, sug-
gesting that population size is more easily manipulated
in smaller towns. Intriguingly, in Germany the pattern is
reversed, with somewhat larger effects at larger thresh-
olds, which may be partly explained by the fact that the
salary ofmayors in Germany often only increases at larger
population thresholds.15
15In additional analysis, we find that the evidence for sorting in
Germany is somewhat sensitive to leaving out one German state
at a time: For example, we cannot reject the null for no sorting at
salary thresholds when Baden-Wu¨rtemburg is dropped. Results are
robust to dropping regions in France and Italy.
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At the bottom of Table 2, we conduct the McCrary
tests at thresholds at which no policy changes, as far as
we are aware. We generated placebo thresholds by taking
the midpoint between each actual threshold in each set-
ting (e.g., in France, the smallest placebo threshold is 300,
which is halfway between 100 and 500) and adding an ar-
bitrary number (117was picked). In none of the countries
do we find discontinuities in the density at these placebo
thresholds.
HowDoes Sorting Happen?
The evidence above is consistent with the view that in
many municipalities in France, Italy, and Germany, offi-
cials and/or citizens respond to population-based policies
bymanipulating population numbers.We now ask briefly
how such manipulation might take place—both because
it might indicate how widespread sorting is likely to be
beyond these three countries and because it might help
us understand the extent to which sorting endangers our
ability to learn from RDD in these and other settings.
It may be useful to distinguish among three distinct
types of local behavior that could produce the manipu-
lative sorting we observe. First and most simple is fraud:
Officials could simply falsify population numbers, in-
venting or ignoring residents in order to achieve desired
population numbers. Second is what we call selective pre-
cision: When a municipality is known to be close to a
consequential population threshold, officials can order
extra checks or selectively expedite/delay procedures in a
way that increases the municipality’s chances of crossing
the threshold.16 (For example, an initial count indicates
999 residents; themayor asks that the figuresbe rechecked,
perhaps focusing on whether all new arrivals have been
properly processed.) Third is strategic recruitment: A mu-
nicipality could make efforts to attract residents (or repel
them) by expediting permits or offering tax incentives
or simply encouraging friends to change their official
residence.
Do local officials have themeans, motive, and oppor-
tunity to implement these sorting strategies in the coun-
tries we study? The assignment of consequential policies
(e.g., the salary of themayor or the electoral system) based
on population thresholds in all three countries provides
a clear motive. Local officials in each country are also
sufficiently involved in the census and in housing and tax
policy to have the means to manipulate. In both France
16Thus, selective precision differs from fraud because legitimate
procedures are accurately carried out; the key is that officials ex-
ercise discretion over which procedures are implemented and/or
with what degree of effort.
and Italy, mayors are responsible for supervising the cen-
sus survey at the local level, including hiring and training
enumerators; in Germany, municipal registry offices pro-
vide reports of births, deaths, and in- and out-flows that
state statistical offices use to update census numbers. In all
three countries, municipalities are also involved in local
development and tax decisions, which suggests that they
have the means to recruit residents. Whether local offi-
cials have the opportunity to implement these strategies
is somewhat more difficult to say. Fraudulently adjusting
or fabricating census surveys in order to achieve a de-
sired population number seems risky in systems where
central authorities oversee local procedures. For all three
mechanisms, the pattern of sorting suggests that local
officials must have very precise information about the
municipality’s unmanipulated census count at the time
when they decide whether or not to engage in manipu-
lation. To see why, note that the most striking feature of
Figures 2, 3, and 4 is the deficit of cities narrowly be-
low the relevant thresholds. This indicates that potential
manipulators know not just whether the municipality is
likely to be very close to the threshold (because cities one
inhabitant below the threshold appear to be much more
likely to manipulate than cities five or 10 below) but also
which side of the threshold they are likely to end up on
(because cities one inhabitant below the threshold appear
to be much more likely to manipulate than cities one
above).17 This in turn suggests that the manipulation we
observe is probably not the result of strategies that would
require substantial time to implement, such as building
new housing; if new residents are registered 2 years after
permits are issued, for example, then cities would need
good information 2 years before the census aboutwhether
the census count would put them just above or just below
a threshold in the absence of new housing. The sorting
we observe could, however, be the result of calling for an
extra check after initial numbers are tallied (i.e., selec-
tive precision) or recruiting a friend from a neighboring
municipality to move into a vacant apartment before the
census takes place (i.e., strategic recruitment).
The case of France may be instructive in highlighting
possible mechanisms for manipulative sorting. The
French census is a joint project between the national
statistics agency (INSEE) and local municipal authori-
ties: INSEE issues directives; the municipalities hire and
train enumerators and submit the results. Municipal
authorities are thus involved in interpreting the complex
17Ifmanipulation occurs through fraud, the observed pattern could
be found if municipalities only knew whether they would be very
close to the threshold. SeeEggers et al. (2015) for a similar argument
about the need for precise information in the case of close elections.
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FIGURE 5 Sorting over Time in France at the 500, 1,000, and
1,500 Population Thresholds
Note: Each point corresponds to the McCrary test statistic (the estimated jump in the
log density of the running variable at the relevant threshold) for a given threshold in
a given census in France. Lines show 95% confidence intervals.
rules that determine how to handle ambiguous cases
such as students, members of the military, and people
without fixed domiciles. The phenomenon of sorting
in the French census was noted as early as 1972 by an
INSEE official (Vernet 1972) who suspected that it could
be explained by local officials, making an extra effort to
locate residents when initial tabulations indicated that
they would otherwise narrowly fall below an important
threshold; to the extent that these efforts involved locating
actual residents (e.g., students who should be enumer-
ated in the municipality), the official’s explanation falls
under what we call selective precision. (If locating means
“inventing,” we would call it fraud.) Consistent with this
explanation, manipulative sorting in France appears to
have diminished over time as central authorities have
exercised more oversight over municipalities’ data collec-
tion procedures. Figure 5 depicts the point estimates and
confidence intervals for McCrary tests at three different
thresholds over time in France, clearly showing a decline
in sorting since the 1980s and a particularly marked drop
in the 1999 census. A former census official explained
this pattern by noting that for the 1999 census, INSEE
instituted special measures to strengthen oversight of the
census, particularly to ensure that students were only
counted once; censuses after 1999 have used a new proce-
dure that uses local tax files (which may be less prone to
manipulation) to produce annual population updates.18
The variation in sorting over time in France suggests
that sorting is less likely to be an issue for population-
threshold RDDs in countries like Sweden and Finland
where local population figures are collected in a highly
centralized way and linked to administrative records.19
AddressingManipulative Sorting
The regression discontinuity design is obviously much
less appealing when there is evidence of sorting around
the threshold. What can a researcher do in such cases?
One approach is to augment the usual RDD analysis
with control variables that capture possible confounding
factors.When sorting introducesbias intoRDDestimates,
it does so because the distribution of covariates differs be-
tween the left and right sides of the threshold. One way
to eliminate this bias, therefore, is to measure these co-
variates and model their relationship to the outcome at
the threshold. In this approach to sorting, an RDD thus
18Personal correspondence with Jean-Michel Durr, former Census
Director at INSEE.
19Consistent with this, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Lyytika¨inen
and Tukiainen (2013) do not find evidence of sorting in Sweden or
Finland.
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FIGURE 6 Best-Case Scenario for AddressingManipulative
Sorting with Covariate Adjustment
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Note: Suppose covariate X is not continuous at the threshold due to sorting, as shown
in the left plot. If X is also related to the outcome, as shown in the right plot, then
the usual RDD estimate (Y+ − Y−) will be biased. The bias due to imbalance in X is
removed if the RDD is estimated conditional on X (e.g., as Y+x=1 − Y−x=1).
becomes more like a typical observational study, in the
sense that onemust identify, measure, and control for ad-
ditional variables. The credibility of the resulting model
will dependonwhatweknowabout theprocess of sorting,
the extent to which we can measure relevant covariates,
and the number of observations near the threshold for
model fitting. It also depends on the extent to which the
outcomevarieswith theunmanipulated running variable.
In the best case, such analysis will retain much of the ap-
peal of the ideal RDD; in the worst case, such analysis will
be nomore attractive (and possibly less attractive because
of the loss in external validity) than a pure observational
study.
To understand some of the considerations in address-
ing manipulative sorting through covariate adjustment,
consider Figure 6, which captures what we think of as
the best-case scenario. Because of sorting, a single binary
covariate X is not continuous at the threshold, as shown
in the left plot. The right plot shows how this induces
bias in the RDD estimate: The expectation of Y condi-
tional on P (our running variable) and X (the covariate)
is completely flat everywhere, but due to the imbalance
in X , the expectation of Y conditional on P (but not
conditional on X) bends as we approach the threshold,
such that the RDD estimate, ˆRDD ≡ limp→P+c E [Y |P =
p] − limp→P−c E [Y |P = p] = Y+ − Y−, is larger than
the effect of the treatment conditional on X = 1 or X =
0 (given by Y+X=x − Y−X=x = limp→P+c E [Y |P = p, X =
x] − limp→P−c E [Y |P = p, X = x], for x = 0, 1). The
bias due to imbalance in X can, however, be removed
by controlling for X in the RDD analysis. In this very
simple case, where E [Y |P , X = 1] − E [Y |P , X = 0] is
independent of P , controlling for X is as simple as addi-
tively including X in the regression. More generally, one
could allow the control function to vary across levels of X
or simply estimate the RDD separately across levels of X .
In practice, addressing sorting by controlling for co-
variates is typically more difficult than in this best-case
scenario for several reasons. First, the task of accurately
modeling the relationship between the outcome and the
covariate (conditional on the running variable) can be
difficult; estimates becomemore dependent onmodeling
choices and subject to sampling variation. Second, even
when we can address the bias due to imbalance in a co-
variate X at the threshold, we can never completely rule
out the concern that our estimates are still biased due to
imbalance in other (unobservable) covariates. For both of
these reasons, we lose some of the attractive simplicity of
the ideal RDD analysis, in which the entire focus is on es-
timating two conditional expectations at the threshold.20
Tomakemattersworse, it should be remembered that
we cannot rule out the possibility of covariate bias even
when there is no sign of discontinuity in the density of
the running variable (as McCrary 2008 noted), because
sorting may go in both directions.21 This suggests that
every RDD study based on population thresholds should
20Another problem is that manipulative sorting introduces mea-
surement error that induces bias when the conditional expectation
depends on the true value of the running variable. That is, cities just
above and below the threshold likely differ in their true population,
but this variable is not observed and thus cannot be controlled for
in a straightforward way. The best way to address this bias would
be to obtain good estimates of the true population and include this
as a control variable in the analysis.
21For example, if authoritarian mayors want a small council and
inclusivemayors want a large council, andmanipulation of popula-
tion figures is possible, thenmayors just above and below a decisive
population threshold may differ systematically even though the
density is continuous. See Caughey and Sekhon (2011) for another
possible example of imbalance without apparent sorting.
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include extensive checks for covariate balance, whether
or not there is evidence of sorting in the aggregate—
particularly in settings where local officials play a role
in producing official figures; when imbalance is evident,
the robustness of conclusions to various control strategies
should be shown. In the next section, we assess the degree
of covariate imbalance in the Italian case as an example.
As an alternative to covariate adjustment, researchers
can also consider a “donut” RDD analysis that ignores
data immediately surrounding the threshold (Barreca
et al. 2011). In settings where the sorting appears to be
limited to the immediate neighborhood of the threshold,
this approach has the advantage that one does not need
to measure and control for all potentially unbalanced
covariates, nor does one need to worry about measure-
ment error due to misreporting of the running variable.
Of course, the very clear disadvantage of the donut ap-
proach is that as we drop more data near the threshold,
our estimates of the conditional expectation function at
the threshold require more extrapolation.
Building on the discussion of the difference-in-
discontinuity design above, in some circumstances one
could take advantage of multiple thresholds to address
sorting or at least give an idea of how problematic it is
likely to be for one’s analysis. For example, one could
extend the logic of the diff-in-disc to “partial out” the
effect of sorting in the special case where a policy of inter-
est changes discontinuously at a threshold at time t1 but
not at time t0, and sorting occurs (perhaps due to con-
founding treatments) in both time periods. Under the
assumption that the bias due to the combination of sort-
ing and the confounding policies is the same just above
the threshold in the two periods (an extension of the local
parallel trends assumption), one can use the diff-in-disc
to identify the effect of the policy of interest for treated
municipalities just above the threshold; under the addi-
tional assumption that the effect of the policy of interest
is the same for municipalities just above and below the
threshold (an extension of the separability assumption),
this is equal to the neighborhood average treatment effect.
Both of these assumptions are likely to be less attractive
than the usual diff-in-disc assumptions: The first assump-
tion will not hold if the policy of interest affects the bias
due to sorting, and the second assumption will not hold
if the effect of the treatment is different for cities that
managed to sort just above the threshold and those that
did not.22
22Less formally, and still building on the diff-in-disc idea but in a
different way, one could compare RDD estimates at two thresholds
where a policy of interest changes but the apparent degree of sorting
is much larger at one threshold than the other; if the estimates at
Sorting and Covariate Imbalance:
The Case of Italy
The previous section provided clear evidence of manipu-
lative sorting in France, Italy, andGermany around popu-
lation thresholdsdeterminingmunicipal policies.This ev-
idence indicates that the key assumption of RDD analysis
(the continuity of potential outcomes across the thresh-
old) may be violated in these cases. While we cannot
directly test this assumption, we can test for covariate
imbalance. In this section, we conduct tests for covariate
imbalance in Italy. Our goal here is to assess the extent of
covariate imbalance in Italy and identify covariates that
should be controlled for in RDD analysis in that setting.
Along the way, we highlight some nonobvious issues that
are likely to arise whenwe test for covariate imbalance us-
ing data drawn frommultiple different thresholds and/or
multiple censuses.
Our main approach to testing for covariate imbal-
ance is to undertake a falsification test in which the
covariate is viewed as the outcome in an RDD analy-
sis. Figure 7 shows an example in which the dependent
variable is the lagged treatment, meaning an indicator
for whether a municipality was above a given popula-
tion threshold in the previous census, given that it was
close to that threshold in the current census. The top
two plots show this analysis for thresholds at which the
salary of the mayor increases. The top left panel shows
that the probability of lagged treatment increases with
the current running variable (as one might expect) but
jumps at the threshold, indicating that cities narrowly
above the threshold are more than 10 percentage points
more likely to have been above the threshold in the pre-
vious census than cities narrowly below the threshold.
The top right panel shows how the estimated jump varies
with the (triangular) bandwidth employed for the lo-
cal linear regression; the black dot shows the bandwidth
suggested by the Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm (see
Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012) and employed in the
figure at left, and the black triangle shows the band-
width suggested by the alternate procedure introduced
in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). This clear
jump indicates that the RDD analysis for Italy could be
biased by the fact that cities above andbelow the threshold
differ systematically in whether they received the treat-
ment in the past. The bottom two plots of Figure 7 use
“placebo” thresholds (with no policy changes) and show
no evidence of similar persistence, which indicates that
these two thresholds are similar, one could conclude that bias due
to sorting plays a small role based on the assumption that this bias
is increasing in the degree of sorting.
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FIGURE 7 Imbalance in Lagged Treatment in Italy
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Note: The dependent variable in the RDD analysis above is “lagged treatment”—an indicator for
whether a municipality was above a given threshold in the previous census, given that it was close
to that threshold in the current census. The left panel in each pair shows the dependent variable
in binned means of the running variable (gray dots) and the local linear regression estimate at
the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal triangular bandwidth; the right panel shows the sensitivity of the
estimated effect to the bandwidth, where the Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth is shown with a dot
and the CCT bandwidth is shown with a triangle.
the results above cannot be explained by generic stickiness
in population figures from one census to the next.
How should this imbalance be interpreted? Themost
straightforward interpretation is that officials with influ-
ence over population figures prefer to prevent cities from
crossing thresholds from one census to the next; for ex-
ample, if a city has shrunk in population such that it is
very close to a population threshold, someone is able to
influence the final numbers to keep it above the threshold.
Note, however, that a different and more subtle interpre-
tation is also available. Recall that our analysis is based on
combining observations near multiple different thresh-
olds across multiple censuses. In such cases, covariate
imbalance can emerge simply because the value of the co-
variate varies across thresholds/censuses and the degree
of sorting varies across thresholds/censuses.
To see this, suppose we were combining data from
a single threshold recorded in just two censuses: one old
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census, at a time when cities near the threshold were
shrinking, and one new census, at a time when cities near
the threshold were growing. Suppose sorting was severe
in the old census but not the new census. The difference
in the severity of sorting means that in the combined
data, a larger proportion of the observations just above
the threshold (compared to just below) will be taken from
the old census; because cities were shrinking at the time
of the old census, observations from the old census would
bemore likely tohavebeen above the threshold in thepast.
Thus, even if there were no imbalance in the probability
of lagged treatment in either census, we could observe
imbalance in this covariate in the combined data.23 The
larger point is that it is tempting to interpret imbalance
in a particular covariate as the cause of the sorting (e.g.,
the probability of lagged treatment jumps because mu-
nicipalities try not to cross thresholds), but it may simply
be an artifact of pooling data from multiple censuses or
thresholds in which the degree of sorting varies.
Table 3 addresses this complication by assessing im-
balance across several covariates (indicated by rows of the
table) while adding controls for the year of the census, the
type of threshold, and other factors. Each of the point es-
timates in this table is anRDD-based estimate of the effect
of crossing population thresholds on the covariate.24 The
estimated effect on lagged treatment (examined graphi-
cally in Figure 7) is reported in column 1 of the first row
as 0.138 (0.037). Columns 2–5 carry out the same anal-
ysis but additively include covariates in the RDD anal-
ysis: dummies for each year of the census (column 2);
dummies for each threshold (column 3); both dummies
(column 4); and a set of covariates describing Italian mu-
nicipalities around the year 2002 (column 5).25 Columns
6–8 show the models from columns 1, 3, and 5 but focus
on “placebo” thresholds where no policy changes. Note
that in the absence of sorting, we expect no effects in any
of these tests; in the presence of policy-induced sorting,
we expect no effects in the placebo thresholds.
Wehave already seen (in Figure 7) that crossing salary
thresholds seems to “affect” the probability of treatment
in the previous census. In the top row of Table 3, we see
23The same argument could be made when we aggregate data from
various thresholds at a single point in time.
24For each outcome, we estimate the optimal bandwidth using the
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) approach; this appears in the
first column. See the supporting information for the same analysis
using CCT bandwidths (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014).
25The covariates are the (log) number of nonprofits per person, the
proportion of inhabitants who give blood, the ratio of young to old
inhabitants, an indicator for the South, an indicator for whether
the municipality is on the seaside, and the proportion of second
homes in the municipality. When a given covariate is used as the
outcome, it is obviously omitted from the list of regressors.
that this imbalance persists when we control for the year
of the census and the threshold being considered. This
suggests that the imbalance in lagged treatment is not
simply explained by variation in the extent of sorting over
time or across thresholds. This imbalance does, however,
mostly disappear when we include municipal covariates
in column 5, which suggests that some of these municipal
characteristics are unbalanced in a similar way, perhaps
because they help explain which cities are able to sort.
The second row indicates that we do not find a similar
effect for the lagged running variable.
In the third and fourth rows of Table 3, we see strong
evidence of imbalance inwhether the council size changes
at the threshold as well as in the year of the census being
considered. This imbalance probably arises for the rea-
son discussed above: Sorting is worse at thresholds where
both council size and salary change (as shown in Table 2)
and in earlier censuses (as shown in Figure 11 in the sup-
porting information); in pooled data, therefore, the type
of threshold and the vintage of the census is systematically
unbalanced, which could cause bias in RDD estimates if
the appropriate covariates are not used.
The rest of Table 3 reports similar analysis for a set
of covariates we selected because we thought they might
explain the aggregate sorting in Italy: two measures of
social capital,26 the proportion of young to old citizens,
an indicator for whether the city is in the South of Italy,
an indicator for whether the city is located by the sea, and
the proportion of second homes. (A large second-home
proportionmay indicate more opportunities for selective
precision.)We findno imbalance in anyof these covariates
in the raw RDD. In columns 2–5, we find some imbal-
ance in the proportion of young to old citizens: The ana-
lysis indicates that cities with an older population are
more likely to be found on the left of the threshold than
to the right. Similarly, we find imbalances in the pro-
portion of second homes at borderline significance levels
(p < .1).
Table 4 in the supporting information reports an-
other approach to the same question. We restrict atten-
tion to cases inwhich amunicipality was within 50 inhab-
itants of a threshold that determines the mayor’s salary;
we then run a weighted ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression (with weights proportional to proximity to the
threshold) in which the dependent variable is a binary
indicator for whether the municipality is above or below
the threshold and the independent variables are the co-
variates we used as outcomes in Table 3. Columns 2–4 add
26Themeasures we use (the number of nonprofit organizations per
person and the rate of blood donations) are commonly used in the
literature as measures of social capital; see Nannicini et al. (2013).
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TABLE 3 “Effects” of Crossing Threshold on Covariates (Italy)
Jump at ThresholdsWhere Salary Changes Jump at Placebo Thresholds
Outcome
Obs.
[BW] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged treatment 2,592 .138∗∗∗ .113∗∗∗ .128∗∗∗ .108∗∗∗ .041 .024 .028 −.055
[132] (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.036) (.041) (.041) (.040)
Lagged running
variable
2,522 80.115 55.194 84.583 63.567 27.862 95.758 124.452 1.985
[128] (63.630) (63.642) (58.183) (57.660) (53.600) (97.363) (79.532) (72.847)
Council size also
changes
1,590 .268∗∗∗ .207∗∗∗
[81.7] (.049) (.046)
Year of census 3,056 −7.091∗∗∗ −3.172∗∗∗ −2.871∗ −1.988
[158.8] (1.045) (.889) (1.620) (1.386)
Population at
threshold (in
1,000s)
1,678 .147 −.091 .346
[86.4] (.401) (.396) (.532)
Log nonprofits/
person
1,647 .001 .011 .026 .023 −.000 .004 .002 −.052
[84.5] (.057) (.058) (.058) (.058) (.058) (.045) (.045) (.045)
Proportion
donating blood
1,570 −.003 −.003 −.003 −.003 −.004∗∗ −.001 −.001 −.001
[80.5] (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Log young/old
ratio
1,815 .045 −.089∗∗ −.045 −.089∗∗∗ −.086∗∗ .027 −.007 −.035
[93.8] (.056) (.040) (.047) (.040) (.039) (.053) (.045) (.034)
South 1,777 .037 .037 .036 .033 −.023 −.012 −.010 −.031
[91.3] (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) (.040) (.050) (.050) (.041)
Seaside 2,077 −.026 −.033 −.031 −.032 −.033 −.012 −.017 −.044∗∗
[106.9] (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.024) (.020) (.020) (.020)
Proportion
vacation homes
1,897 .025 .043∗ .033 .037∗ .037∗ .032 .040∗ .021
[97.8] (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.021) (.020)
Year dummies
√ √ √ √
Threshold
dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Other municipal
characteristics
√ √
Note: Each point estimate comes from a different RDD analysis in which the row variable is the dependent variable and we pool data from
multiple censuses and population thresholds. Model 1 includes no extra control variables; Model 2 includes a dummy for the year of the
census; Model 3 includes a dummy for each threshold (e.g., 1,000, 2,000); Model 4 includes both year and threshold dummies; Model 5
adds controls for municipal characteristics (e.g., indicator for South, proportion of vacation homes) apart from the one being used as the
dependent variable. Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
dummy variables for year and threshold; columns 5–8 re-
peat the analysis for placebo thresholds at which no policy
changes. The coefficients in column 1 of Table 4 indicate
that a municipality close to the threshold is more likely
to be above the threshold if it was above that threshold in
the previous census and if the council size also changes
at that threshold; there is also some evidence that cities
with fewer blood donations andmore vacation homes are
more likely to be found above the threshold, conditional
on being close. (Column 5 presents the same regression
applied to placebo thresholds. Nothing predicts whether
a city is above or below these arbitrary cutoffs; the null
hypothesis that all of the coefficients are zero cannot be
rejected.) When we add dummy variables for year and
threshold in column 4, none of the coefficients shown is
statistically significant at the .05 level; this indicates that
although sorting differed over time and across thresh-
olds, these covariates are generally well balanced at each
threshold and in each census. Still, the results of Table 4
confirm that the cases above and below policy-relevant
thresholds are different in ways that must be addressed
in any population-threshold RDD in Italy. Most tellingly,
the F-test of the regression (bottom two lines of the ta-
ble) indicates that these variables jointly predict whether
a municipality-year will be above or below a population
threshold (conditional on being close to that threshold)
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when the threshold determines policy (columns 1–4), but
not otherwise (columns 5–8).
What can we conclude from this evidence on covari-
ate imbalance at salary thresholds in Italy? The optimistic
conclusion is that researchers can productively conduct
RDD in Italy using multiple thresholds and/or multiple
censuses as long as they include appropriate controls,
which, based on this analysis, would include an indi-
cator for lagged treatment, indicators for the year and
the threshold, and perhaps controls for the age struc-
ture of the population and the proportion of second
homes. Although it appears that many Italian municipal-
ities attempt to manipulate their population to surpass
policy-relevant thresholds—and many succeed—it does
not appear that the ones that succeed are much different
from those that fail; this suggests that it may still be a
viable strategy to compare cities above and below thresh-
olds. The pessimistic conclusion is that there are many
covariates we have not examined (including, of course,
unobservable covariates), and thus RDD analysis may be
biased even after controlling for the set of covariates we
have tested here. The clear implication from this analysis
is that studies that pool data across thresholds and years
should control for the threshold and year whenever sort-
ing seems like a possibility; whether or not one wants to
proceed with a population-threshold RDD setting with
evidence of sorting depends, as we discuss in the next
section, on what the next best design is.
Concluding Remarks
We have documented two serious problems with
population-threshold RDDs in France, Italy, and
Germany. Although important policies depend on pop-
ulation thresholds in each country, these policies often
change alongwith other policies, andmunicipalities seem
to strategically manipulate population figures to end up
on the desired side of relevant thresholds. We have dis-
cussed remedies that researchers might use to address
compound treatment andmanipulative sorting; applying
these remedies requires additional assumptions, which of
course makes the analysis less compelling than a standard
RDD. The practical question that remains is whether we
should bother to undertake population-threshold RDDs
in a settingwhere these remedies (and associated assump-
tions) are necessary.
The answer to this question, of course, depends on
what the alternative is—that is,what thenext best research
design is for addressing the research question. If the alter-
native is to carry out another population-threshold RDD
in a setting that addresses the research question equally
well but does not suffer from compound treatment and
sorting, clearly the alternative would be better. If the al-
ternative is to conduct an observational study in a setting
where the municipalities choose their own policies, the
answer is less clear.
Ultimately, the choice depends on how much un-
observable imbalance remains in the RDD and the ob-
servational study after we apply our various corrections,
and how much these omitted variables affect the out-
come in each setting; this in turn will depend on not only
how well we understand the process by which munici-
palities choose their policies in the observational setting
and how sorting takes place in the RDD, but also how
well we can measure and control for the covariates that
are unbalanced as a result of these processes. All of these
considerations are subjective judgments and cannot be
measured in the data. Substantive knowledge is thus nec-
essary; the best answer may be to conduct both sets of
analysis. What is most clear to us is that a population-
threshold RDD should not be dismissed in favor of al-
ternatives simply because there is evidence of compound
treatment or manipulative sorting. Observational stud-
ies have similar problems: Policies tend to be correlated
with each other in cross-section, and omitted variable
bias is always a concern when units choose their own
treatments. Given the difficulty of running experiments
on consequential policies, it would be unwise to exclu-
sively rely on purely observational evidence and ignore
findings from population-threshold RDDs when these
quasi-experiments fall short of the ideal.
More broadly, we also emphasize that, despite the
clear challenges of carrying out population-threshold
RDDs in the three countries we study, none of our analy-
sis implies that all such designs are problematic. Clearly,
researchers should check for compound treatment, sort-
ing, and covariate imbalance whenever they conduct any
RDD; the cases we have shown indicate that these prob-
lems can be systematic in some settings. But just as it
would be a mistake to discard a specific RDD at the first
sign of compound treatment or manipulative sorting, it
would also be amistake to conclude based on our analysis
that all population-threshold RDDs must suffer from the
same problems.
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